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INSIDER TRADING FLAW:   
TOWARD A FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET 
THEORY AND BEYOND 
KENNETH R. DAVIS* 
No federal law specifically makes insider trading unlawful. Current law is 
based on section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the general antifraud 
provision. The deception giving rise to a trading violation under section 10(b) 
is a breach of fiduciary duty to the source of the information. This approach is 
misguided because the source of the information is not injured by the trade. 
Rather, the counterparty to the trade is injured, and, in a more general sense, 
confidence in the securities markets suffers as a result of trading on material, 
nonpublic information. Even worse, current law does not clearly prohibit the 
use of inside information in circumstances that no sensible law would 
condone. For example, suppose a thief steals corporate inside information and 
trades on that information. It is unclear whether the thief has violated section 
10(b). Similarly, if a corporate insider provides material, nonpublic 
information to a friend and the friend trades on the information, it is unclear 
whether either party has violated the law. This Article proposes replacing the 
current regime with fraud-on-the-market theory based on the well-recognized 
duty to publicly disclose inside information or abstain from trading. A breach 
of that duty would be a fraud on the public and the counterparty, and would 
therefore violate section 10(b). The Article goes on to analyze and critique 
congressional bills that propose new insider trading legislation. 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law and Ethics, Fordham University Graduate School of Business.  
J.D., University of Toledo, School of Law, 1977; M.A., University of California, Long Beach, 
1971; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1969.  Thanks to my wife, Jean, 
whose wizardry as a law librarian makes crucial sources suddenly materialize. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the law of insider trading has perplexed the legal 
community.1  Scholars have criticized the law for its lack of clarity and 
over-complexity.2  Such criticisms are understandable.  Insider trading 
law is a dysfunctional hodge-podge of rules that make little intuitive 
sense.  The problem arises in part because no U.S. statute defines 
insider trading.  Rather, the United States Supreme Court, with 
minimal congressional guidance, has seized on the general antifraud 
provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 to construct an 
incoherent legal regime.  Section 10(b) of the Act makes it unlawful to 
use “any manipulative or deceptive device” “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.”4  The Supreme Court has used this 
broad injunction as the starting point to fabricate a confusing brand of 
insider trading law.  In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court’s 
“common law” of insider trading disregards common sense.5 
                                                          
 1. This Article refers to all circumstances under which a party trades on 
material, nonpublic information as “insider trading.”  This term includes what is 
often referred to as “outsider trading.”  See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the 
Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
881, 884 (2010) (explaining that the term “outsider trading” is frequently used to 
describe trading by a non-insider possessing material, nonpublic information). 
 2. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Manne’s Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of 
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 949 (1985) (calling federal insider trading law 
“unconstitutionally vague”); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of 
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 379 (1999) (calling the misappropriation theory 
of insider trading a “theoretical mess”); Thomas Swigert & Milo Marsden, Insider 
Trading:  The Supreme Court Takes Another Look, DORSEY (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/02/insider 
-trading--supreme-court-takes-another-look (commenting that insider trading law is 
“notoriously murky”).  But see Peter J. Henning, What’s So Bad About Insider Trading 
Law?, 70 BUS. LAW. 751, 775 (2015) (arguing that insider trading law, though 
imperfect, “works fairly well as a legal doctrine”). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012). 
 4. Id. § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange[:] . . . (b) To use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap 
agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
 5. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (adopting the 
misappropriation theory of liability); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654–64 (1983) 
(establishing the contours of tipper/tippee liability); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 231–35 (1980) (adopting the classical or traditional theory of liability and finding no 
duty to disclose for a non-corporate insider who had no confidential information). 
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The fundamental problem with current insider trading law is that 
the Supreme Court has defined a “manipulative or deceptive device” as 
a breach of a fiduciary duty or confidentiality to the source of the inside 
information.6  A breach of such a duty, however, has little, if anything, to 
do with what one would consider wrongful trading on material, 
nonpublic information.  The trade is a wrong that is distinct from the 
breach of such a duty.  Furthermore, the source of the inside 
information suffered no loss resulting from a trade made with inside 
information.  The person with inside information deceived the 
counterparty who alone suffered financial injury.7  The law should 
therefore focus on a breach of the duty, established in In re Cady, Roberts 
& Co.,8 to disclose publicly the material information, thereby making it 
available to everyone, including the counterparty to the trade.9 
Another fault of insider trading law is that in a tipper/tippee 
scenario, liability arises only when the original tipper derived a 
benefit from the original tippee.10  This requirement, which the 
Supreme Court adopted in Dirks v. SEC,11 is extraneous to the wrong 
that insider trading law seeks to redress.  When a tippee knowingly 
trades on material, nonpublic information, liability should not 
depend on whether the tipper received a benefit for the information.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s discussion of this requirement has 
engendered a split among the circuit courts.12  The issue is whether 
the requisite benefit to the tipper must be direct, such as a financial 
or reputational benefit, or whether the benefit may be indirect—that 
is, whether simply providing the inside information to a relative or 
friend constitutes such a benefit.13  The United States Court of 
                                                          
 6. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229–30.  This Article uses the term “inside information” 
to mean material, nonpublic information. 
 7. See infra Section II.B (explaining that the focus should not be on the method 
used to obtain the information and that the harm done is not borne by the source or 
owner of the information). 
 8. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 9. Id. at 911. 
 10. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (prohibiting the exploitation of inside information 
when the insider derives a personal gain from the use of the information). 
 11. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 12. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that providing inside information to a relative or friend does not meet the personal 
benefit requirement of Dirks), with United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that providing the inside information to a relative or friend does 
meet the personal benefit requirement of Dirks), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 13. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092.  The Supreme Court limited the issue on appeal to 
whether a tip to a relative or friend constitutes a benefit sufficient to meet the 
requirement of Dirks.  136 S. Ct. at 899. 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. Newman14 that a 
concrete benefit—either financial or reputational—is required,15 
while the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Salman16 that the duty 
prescribed in Dirks is met when the tipper passes the information to a 
relative or friend.17  This schism between the Second and Ninth 
Circuits has spawned inconsistency in the law that federal courts 
apply in insider trading cases.18  Given this confusion, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), with mixed success, has urged 
courts to apply the Salman standard.19  To resolve this issue, the 
Supreme Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
Salman case.20  Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules, insider 
trading law will remain focused on the wrong issues. 
One promising approach to resolving the contradictions of insider 
trading law is to adopt a fraud-on-the-market theory.  The application 
of this theory would be based on the Cady, Roberts duty to publicly 
disclose inside information.  This approach would continue to use 
section 10(b) as the operative provision.  Though having the virtue of 
conceptual clarity, this theory would reach only those cases where the 
trade occurred in a market efficient at disseminating material 
information.  Because most insider trading cases involve securities 
traded on efficient markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) or NASDAQ, this limitation would not pose a serious 
impediment to establishing an effective law of insider trading.21  
                                                          
 14. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 15. Id. at 452. 
 16. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).  On 
October 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the Salman case.  Ben 
Protess & Matthew Goldstein, What Is a ‘Personal Benefit’ from Insider Trading?  Justices 
Hear Arguments, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5., 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/ 
business/dealbook/supreme-court-insider-trading.html?_r=0. 
 17. Id. at 1093. 
 18. Compare United States v. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2015) 
(rejecting the Newman court’s narrow interpretation of the Dirks benefit 
requirement), with SEC v. Holley, No. 11-0205, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 
21, 2015) (adopting Newman’s interpretation of Dirks), and SEC v. McGinnis, No. 
5:14-cv-6, 2015 WL 5643186, at *18 (D. Vt. Sept. 23, 2015) (citing with approval the 
Newman court’s interpretation of Dirks). 
 19. See Elaine Greenberg & Kevin Askew, SEC Enforcement:  2015 in Review, and a 
Look Ahead, 48 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 586 (Mar. 21, 2016) (outlining two cases in 
which the SEC was unsuccessful in enforcement proceedings, but one case where it 
prevailed in a civil case after criminal charges were dismissed in light of Newman). 
 20. Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 21. Every case cited in this Article involved a trade on a well-recognized securities 
market where information was efficiently disseminated to the public. 
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Nevertheless, a complete solution to the problems of current insider 
trading law should come from Congress.22  There has been progress.  
Representative Lynch has proposed a bill to redefine unlawful insider 
trading.23  Representative Himes has proposed a bill calling for 
broader changes.24  Senators Reed and Menendez have proposed a 
bill that would establish an even more expansive scope of liability 
than the two House proposals.25 
These recent judicial and legislative developments present a fresh 
opportunity to reconsider the law of insider trading and to propose a 
new and more coherent framework.  Part I of this Article analyzes the 
three existing theories of unlawful insider trading:  the classical 
theory, the misappropriation theory, and tipper/tippee liability.  Part 
I also contrasts the Newman and Salman decisions. 
Part II exposes the flaws of the three theories discussed in Part I.  
As noted, the primary flaw in the classical and misappropriation 
theories is the focus on a breach of a fiduciary duty or confidentiality 
to the source of the information rather than a breach of the duty of 
disclosure owed to the counterparty to the trade.  This Part also 
discusses the anomalous pre-condition to tipper/tippee liability that 
Dirks imposes; namely, that the tipper receives a benefit. 
Part III explores how to improve insider trading law.  First, this Part 
examines the presumption of reliance created in Affiliated Ute Citizens 
v. United States26 and concludes that the Affiliated Ute Citizens 
presumption does not provide a satisfactory resolution.  Next, this 
Part proposes extending fraud-on-the-market theory to insider 
trading cases.  This extension of fraud-on-the-market theory would 
refocus insider trading liability under section 10(b) to a breach of the 
                                                          
 22. See Che Odom, Congress Should Define ‘Insider Trading’:  Ex-SEC Official, 48 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 405 (Feb. 24, 2016) (arguing that “[a] statute is needed to 
create some certainty in the law,” and suggesting that “‘[f]raud on the market’ could 
be used as a baseline standard for such a statute”).  The Supreme Court adopted fraud-
on-the-market theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  The Court stated 
that “[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the market price does so in reliance on the 
integrity of that price.  Because most publicly available information is reflected in 
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, 
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”  Id. at 247.  The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of fraud-on-the-market theory in Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).  See infra Part III for a more 
detailed discussion of fraud-on-the-market theory. 
 23. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 24. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 25. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 26. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
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Cady, Roberts duty of disclosure owed to the public and to the 
counterparty to the trade.  Though conceptually coherent, this 
approach has the drawback of applying only to efficient markets.  
This drawback is relatively minor because most insider trading 
involves securities traded on such markets.  Nevertheless, a new law is 
needed to provide a more comprehensive framework that would 
clarify and expand the boundaries of unlawful insider trading. 
Part IV discusses and criticizes the three congressional proposals to 
redefine unlawful insider trading.  This Part recommends 
broadening the scope of conduct prohibited under the Reed-
Menendez proposal. 
The Article concludes with a call to Congress to enact a much-
needed law that would establish a simple, comprehensive, and 
sensible law of insider trading. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Three theories of liability establish the prohibitions on insider 
trading law:  (1) the classical or traditional theory, (2) 
misappropriation theory, and (3) tipper/tippee liability.  This Part of 
the Article discusses and analyzes these three theories. 
A. The Classical Theory 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of 
“any manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.27  In Chiarella v. United States,28 a 
landmark insider trading case, the Court interpreted the quoted 
language of section 10(b) to forbid a breach of fiduciary duty, 
rejecting the premise that section 10(b) imposes a general duty 
against trading on inside information.29 
Chiarella was a printer working for Pandick Press, which printed 
documents announcing corporate takeover bids.30  Though the 
names of the target companies did not appear on documents 
                                                          
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 28. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 29. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32.  The Court also relied on SEC Rule 10b-5.  Id. at 
225.  That rule, which supplements section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person 
to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or to “engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 30. Id. at 224. 
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provided to Chiarella, he was able to deduce the names.31  He traded 
the stock of these companies, without disclosing the names of the 
targets publicly, and he ultimately profited more than $30,000.32 
The issue in Chiarella was whether section 10(b) imposes a general 
prohibition against trading on material, nonpublic information.33  
The Court responded that “liability is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction.”34  The Court explained that “[a]pplication 
of the duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate 
insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare 
before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use 
of material, nonpublic information.”35  The duty to disclose or abstain 
from trading, as first expressed in Cady, Roberts, however, extended 
only to those who have a fiduciary duty to corporate shareholders.36  
Thus, the duty did not apply to everyone in possession of inside 
information.37  The Court justified this holding by noting that section 
10(b) does “not [forbid] every instance of financial unfairness”;38 it 
prohibits only breaches of fiduciary duty.  Chiarella had no fiduciary 
duty to the target companies—the companies whose stock he 
traded.39  He had a relationship only with the acquiring company 
because Pandick Press worked for it.40  Because Chiarella traded the 
stock of the target companies to which he owed no duty, he had not 
violated section 10(b).41 
                                                          
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 226. 
 34. Id. at 230. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 232. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 232, 234–35 (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, 
but what it catches must be fraud.  When an allegation of fraud is based upon 
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.  We hold that a duty to 
disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information.”). 
 39. Id. at 232–33.  Nor was Chiarella a corporate insider of the target companies. 
Id. at 231. 
 40. Id. at 232–33. 
 41. Id.  Justice Stevens noted that an alternative theory of liability was arguable; 
namely, that Chiarella had violated a duty to Pandick Press, his employer.  Id. at 238 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  Because the government had not argued this 
misappropriation theory, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court was correct in not 
addressing that issue.  Id.  Justice Brennan argued that, in addition to the classical 
theory, section 10(b) prohibited the misappropriation of insider information any 
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B. Misappropriation Theory 
The Chiarella Court left open the issue of whether the 
misappropriation of confidential information, absent a fiduciary duty 
to shareholders, constituted a violation of section 10(b).42  In United 
States v. O’Hagan,43 the Court held that section 10(b) forbids such 
misappropriation.44  Grand Met retained the law firm Dorsey & 
Whitney to represent it in its planned tender offer to acquire 
Pillsbury.45  Anticipating the tender offer, O’Hagan, a partner of 
Dorsey & Whitney, bought Pillsbury shares and call options.46  When 
Grand Met announced the tender offer, Pillsbury common stock 
vaulted from thirty-nine dollars to sixty dollars per share, and 
O’Hagan made a profit of more than $4.3 million.47 
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan answered the question left open in 
Chiarella, recognizing the misappropriation theory as a basis of 
liability for insider trading.48  The Court explained that a person 
engages in unlawful insider trading under section 10(b) by 
misappropriating “confidential information for securities trading 
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information.”49  Unlike the classical theory, which focuses on a 
fiduciary duty that a corporate insider owes to a company, the 
misappropriation theory premises liability on anyone who, entrusted 
with confidential information, trades on such information.50  The 
rationale for liability under the misappropriation theory is that by 
                                                          
time the source of the information expected the recipient to abstain from trading on 
it.  Id. at 238–39 (Brennan, J., concurring).  He found, however, that the jury 
instructions did not adequately charge misappropriation, and he therefore 
concurred in the judgment.  Id. at 239.  Chief Justice Burger not only believed that 
section 10(b) adopts the misappropriation theory of liability, but he also concluded 
that the government did argue the case on that basis; he therefore dissented.  Id. at 
243–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun, whom Justice Marshall joined, 
wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that section 10(b)’s prohibition against 
engaging in “manipulative” schemes applies to anyone who, with knowledge that 
material, nonpublic information has been kept confidential, trades on that 
information.  Id. at 252 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 236 (majority opinion) (“We need not decide whether this 
[misappropriation] theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury.”). 
 43. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 44. Id. at 647. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 648. 
 48. Id. at 665. 
 49. Id. at 652. 
 50. Id. 
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trading on confidential information, a person has deceived the 
source.51  Such trading therefore constitutes “a deceptive device or 
contrivance,” which is forbidden under section 10(b).52 
From a policy point of view, the Court observed that the 
misappropriation theory promotes investor confidence.53  Average 
investors would not be able to overcome the disadvantage they would 
face when competing with those trading on misappropriated 
information.54  Allowing the trading of securities based on 
misappropriated information would therefore undermine investor 
confidence and would discourage potential investors from 
participating in capital markets.55 
C. Tipper/Tippee Liability 
Dirks v. SEC is the seminal case on insider trading involving a tipper 
and a tippee.  As shown below, the elements of tipper/tippee liability 
remain controversial thirty years after the Dirks decision. 
1. The Dirks case 
Raymond Dirks was an officer of a broker-dealer that analyzed 
insurance company securities and provided the analyses to 
institutional investors.56  Equity Funding was a company that sold life 
insurance and mutual fund shares to its customers.57  Ronald Secrist, 
a former officer of Equity Funding, revealed to Dirks that Equity 
Funding had fraudulently overstated its assets, and he urged Dirks to 
disclose the fraud publicly.58  Dirks investigated Secrist’s charges and 
found that certain employees of Equity Funding corroborated 
Secrist’s allegations of fraud.59  Dirks discussed this information with 
many of his clients, including five investment advisors who liquidated 
more than $16 million of Equity Funding securities.60  Dirks also 
revealed the fraud to William Blundell, a reporter for the Wall Street 
Journal, but Blundell, who feared a libel suit, declined to print a story 
                                                          
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 653. 
 53. Id. at 658–59 (“Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities 
markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where 
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 658. 
 56. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). 
 57. Id. at 649. 
 58. Id.  Neither Dirks nor his firm had a financial interest in Equity Funding.  Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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revealing Dirks’s allegations.61  In the meantime, Equity Funding 
stock plunged from twenty-six dollars to fifteen dollars per share, 
prompting the NYSE to halt trading of the stock.62  The State of 
California then impounded Equity Funding’s records, finding 
evidence of massive fraud.63  Soon thereafter, the SEC filed a 
complaint against Equity Funding, and the Wall Street Journal 
published an article based largely on information that Dirks had 
provided.64  Equity Funding went into receivership immediately after 
the SEC action and the news article.65 
After an administrative law judge conducted a hearing into Dirks’s 
involvement in the Equity Funding scandal, the SEC found that, by 
disclosing material, nonpublic information about Equity Funding to 
his clients, Dirks had aided and abetted violations of section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933.66  The tippees, his clients, had committed primary violations of 
the acts because they (1) knew or should have known the information 
was confidential, (2) knew or should have known that the source of 
the information was a corporate insider, and (3) traded on the 
information.67  Because the tippees met these three elements, they 
violated the Cady, Roberts duty to disclose the information publicly or 
to abstain from trading on it.68  Despite finding that Dirks had aided 
and abetted securities law violations, the SEC merely censured him 
because he had helped reveal the fraud.69  Nevertheless, Dirks 
appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision.70  
The circuit court held that the recipients of nonpublic information 
inherit the fiduciary duties of corporate executives who provided the 
information.71  The U.S. Supreme Court granted Dirks’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari.72 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 649–50. 
 62. Id. at 650. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 650–51.  Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 also prohibits the 
fraudulent sale of securities.  15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012). 
 67. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650–51. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 651–52. 
 70. Id. at 652. 
 71. Id. (concluding that as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks also had 
violated independent obligations to the SEC and the public). 
 72. Id. 
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a. The majority decision 
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming Chiarella, which held that 
there is no general duty to disclose material, nonpublic information.73  
A person, according to Chiarella, must have a fiduciary duty to the 
company to trigger section 10(b) liability.74  Even given a fiduciary 
duty, the very language of section 10(b) forbids only those breaches 
that involve “manipulation or deception.”75  Such a “manipulation or 
deception,” the Court believed, occurs when the insider trades on 
material, nonpublic information and reaps “secret profits.”76 
The Dirks Court recognized, however, that assigning liability to 
tippees requires an analytic step that the Chiarella Court did not 
make.77  The question was whether, as the circuit court had held, a 
non-insider tippee automatically inherited the duty of an insider 
tipper and, if not, what elements must be met for tippee liability to 
arise.78  In resolving this issue, the Court rejected the SEC’s view that 
tippees inherit the fiduciary obligations of corporate insiders.79  The 
fallacy in the SEC’s reasoning, said the Court, stemmed from the 
mistaken belief that sections 10(b) and 17(a) require equal 
information to all market participants.80  The Court observed that 
analysts, in the course of researching securities, often acquire 
material, nonpublic information and that the acquisition of such 
information is a necessary function of a vibrant securities market.81 
To trigger liability, a corporate insider who acts as a tipper must 
exploit the information for personal gain, which may be financial or 
reputational.82  The Court went further, noting that the relationship 
between the parties may imply personal gain for the tipper.83  For 
example, providing material, nonpublic information to a relative or 
friend who trades on the information is unlawful because the insider 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 654. 
 74. Id. at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–35 (1980)). 
 75. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1977)). 
 76. Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)) (explaining that 
the secret profit stems from such deceptive behavior). 
 77. Id. at 655. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  The SEC argued that Dirks breached a duty when he knowingly received 
confidential information from insiders at Equity Funding, which placed him, and 
similar tippees, in the same position as insiders once he knowingly transmitted that 
information to a likely trader.  Id. at 655–56. 
 80. Id. at 657. 
 81. Id. at 658–59. 
 82. Id. at 659, 663. 
 83. Id. at 664. 
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has effectively traded for himself and given the profits to the relative or 
friend.84  Additionally, the Court stated that for a tippee to be liable for 
unlawful insider trading, the tippee must know or have reason to know 
that the tipper reaped such a gain.85  If a tippee does not have reason 
to know that the tipper profited from the transaction, the actions of 
the tippee cannot be related back to the tipper’s improper conduct 
and, therefore, the tippee has not violated section 10(b).86 
Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court first noted that 
Dirks, an outsider to Equity Funding, owed no fiduciary duty to its 
shareholders.87  Because he did not breach a duty when he passed the 
information to his clients, no liability attached as a result of those 
disclosures.88  The Court then turned to the actions of Secrist, who 
received no personal benefit for providing the information about 
Equity Funding to Dirks.89  Rather, Secrist’s desire to expose the 
fraud motivated the disclosure.90  Absent any personal gain on 
Secrist’s part, no derivative liability arose against Dirks.91 
b. The dissenting opinion 
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices 
Brennan and Marshall joined.92  Justice Blackmun observed that 
Secrist’s intent in disclosing the fraud to Dirks was to trigger sales of 
Equity Funding stock by Dirks’s clients and thus force the SEC to 
recognize the fraud.93  According to Justice Blackmun, Secrist 
accomplished by proxy what the law forbade him to do directly.94  
Under these facts, Dirks committed unlawful insider trading.95  
Justice Blackmun argued cogently that the majority’s analytic error 
                                                          
 84. Id.  Whether tipping a relative or friend constitutes a benefit to the tipper is 
unsettled.  Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(holding that a tip to a relative or friend is not sufficient in itself to constitute a 
benefit to the tipper), with United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2015) (holding that such a close personal relationship is sufficient), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 85. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 86. Id. at 661. 
 87. Id. at 665. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 666–67. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 669. 
 94. Id. at 671. 
 95. Id. 
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was holding that, for liability to arise, the insider must benefit from 
the disclosure.96  The duty to abstain from trading on inside 
information does not depend on motives; rather, it seeks to avoid 
harm by prohibiting the trade.97  An Equity Funding shareholder who 
bought stock from Dirks’s clients was injured regardless of Secrist’s 
motives in disclosing the information to Dirks.98 
2. The conflict between the Newman and Salman decisions 
Dirks seemed to have made clear that when a tipper provided inside 
information to a friend or relative who traded on the information, the 
tipper received a benefit sufficient to trigger liability.  Despite the apparent 
clarity of this rule, the Second Circuit in Newman held otherwise. 
a. The Newman decision 
In United States v. Newman, the government alleged that insiders 
from Dell and NVIDIA disclosed to financial analysts the earnings of 
both companies before releasing the information to the public.99  
After extensive tipping chains, Newman and Chiasson, both portfolio 
managers, received the Dell and NVIDIA information, traded on it, 
and profited $4 million and $68 million respectively.100 
Newman and Chiasson argued that they had not violated insider 
trading law because the original tippers did not receive a personal 
benefit.101  The principal issue was whether providing inside 
information to a friend, absent acquiring a more tangible benefit 
from the friend making a trade on that information, met the Dirks 
benefit requirement.102  The original tipper of the Dell information 
was Rob Ray, who passed the information to his friend, Sandy 
Goyal.103  The Second Circuit noted that the two were not “close” 
friends, though they had known each other for years, having 
attended the same business school and having worked together at 
                                                          
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 674–75 (citing Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 273 (1951)) 
(analogizing Secrist’s conduct to that of a trustee who is liable for a breach of 
fiduciary duty to his or her beneficiaries regardless of fault and regardless of whether 
the trustee benefited from the breach of fiduciary duty, and thus arguing that the law 
should hold corporate fiduciaries to the same standard). 
 98. Id. at 671. 
 99. 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 444 (arguing also that the evidence did not prove they knew the 
original tipper received a personal benefit). 
 102. Id. at 447. 
 103. Id. at 443. 
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Dell.104  Hyung Lim, the original NVIDIA tipper, provided the 
information to Chris Choi, a family friend Lim met at church and 
with whom Lim occasionally socialized.105  Yet, the Second Circuit 
dismissed the government’s contention that these relationships met 
the personal benefit requirement of Dirks.106  The court stated:  “[W]e 
hold that such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof 
of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an 
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”107 
b. The Salman decision 
In United States v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Second 
Circuit, held that providing inside information to a friend, even 
without acquiring a more tangible gain, may satisfy Dirks.108  In 
Salman, Maher Kara, a healthcare investment banking employee at 
Citigroup, shared material, nonpublic information with his brother, 
Michael.109  Maher became engaged to Salman’s sister and, over the 
course of the engagement, Salman and Michael became close 
friends.110  Michael then shared with Salman information he had 
received from Maher.111  Rather than trading in his own brokerage 
account, Salman traded through the account of his wife’s sister and 
her husband, Karim Bayyouk.112  Salman and Bayyouk split the 
profits, which totaled approximately $1.7 million.113  When Salman 
asked Michael who furnished the information, Michael revealed that 
Maher was the source.114  The government proved at trial that (1) 
Maher and Michael had a close personal relationship, and (2) 
Salman knew the nature of that relationship.115 
The principal issue in the case was whether the relationship 
between Maher and Michael was sufficient to meet the personal 
benefit prong of Dirks.116  Salman urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt 
                                                          
 104. Id. at 452. 
 105. Id. at 443, 452. 
 106. Id. at 453. 
 107. Id. at 452. 
 108. 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 109. Id. at 1088–89. 
 110. Id. at 1089. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1089–90. 
 116. Id. at 1091. 
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the holding of Newman, which rejected the proposition that 
disclosing inside information to a trading relative or friend per se 
constitutes a personal benefit.117  Rather, Salman urged that Dirks 
requires that when information is passed to a relative or friend, the 
tip must carry the potential of a financial or reputational benefit.118  
The Ninth Circuit held that, to the extent that Salman’s reading of 
Newman was correct, such a holding was inconsistent with Dirks.119  To 
dispel any doubt that its interpretation of Dirks was sound, the Ninth 
Circuit quoted Dirks, which stated:  “The elements of fiduciary duty 
and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider 
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.”120  Dirks, according to the Ninth Circuit, required nothing 
more than the relationship.121 
Salman filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.122  One of the questions 
presented was whether a family relationship or friendship, standing 
alone, meets the personal benefit requirement of Dirks.123  The Supreme 
Court granted the petition, limiting the appeal to that issue.124 
Dirks appears to answer the question raised in Salman.  The 
Supreme Court made clear that a personal relationship, whether 
arising from family or friendship, confers a benefit on the tipper.125  
The Second Circuit in Newman interpreted this language as “indicating 
that the tipper’s gain need not be immediately pecuniary,” but that “the 
personal benefit received in exchange for confidential information 
must be of some consequence.”126  This reading of Dirks seems 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 1093. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1093–94 (finding the Second Circuit’s holding untenable and pointing 
out the absurd conclusion of Salman’s theory that “a corporate insider or other 
person in possession of confidential and proprietary information would be free to 
disclose that information to her relatives, and they would be free to trade on it, 
provided only that she asked for no tangible compensation in return”). 
 120. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983); Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092–93 
(noting that the Newman decision quoted that dispositive language, and suggesting 
that the Second Circuit effectively conceded its misinterpretation of Dirks). 
 121. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093. 
 122. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016) 
(No. 15-628). 
 123. Id. at 11. 
 124. Salman, 136 S. Ct. at 899. 
 125. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 126. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 122, at 13 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662) (“[T]he test 
is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.  
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders.”). 
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doubtful.  Dirks did not dwell on the intimacy of a relationship or the 
likelihood of future gains.127  Tipping any relative or friend would 
seem, under Dirks, to constitute a personal benefit.128  The same 
conclusion follows from a policy point of view.  To allow a person with 
inside information to feed that information to a friend or relative 
would further tarnish an already discredited securities marketplace.129 
Though the issue of whether tipping a relative or friend is an 
important one, Salman and Newman implicitly raise even more 
fundamental questions.  For example, why is any benefit to the tippee 
required to establish unlawful insider trading under section 10(b)?  
Even more important is the central question:  Are the classical, 
misappropriation, and tipper/tippee theories sensible applications of 
section 10(b)?  Part II of this Article discusses these questions. 
II. THE INCOHERENCE OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Fashioned by a series of Supreme Court decisions, the regime 
establishing liability for insider trading is deeply flawed.  As shown 
below, the major decisions—Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks—are riddled 
with incoherence.  If section 10(b) is the vehicle for establishing 
insider trading law, it must be applied in a wholly new manner.130 
                                                          
 127. Even so, sometimes the evidence shows a benefit meeting Newman’s 
restrictive standard.  In SEC v. Payton, the jury found two former brokers liable for 
insider trading.  97 F. Supp. 3d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  See Patricia Hurtado, SEC 
Overcomes Tougher Insider Standards in Broker Suit, 48 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 459 
(Feb. 29, 2016) (reporting that the SEC did not rely merely on a friendship to prove 
that the tipper received a benefit and that the original tipper received monetary 
benefits from his tippee including a reduction in rent). 
 128. Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (taking an 
expansive reading of the Dirks benefit requirement), SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632 
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that providing inside information to a trading friend meets 
the Dirks benefit requirement), and United States v. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 
1376 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (declining to follow the Newman court’s interpretation of the 
Dirks benefit requirement), with SEC v. McGinnis, No. 5:14-cv-6, 2015 WL 5643186, at 
*18 (D. Vt. Sept 23, 2015) (stating that Newman made clear that a mere friendship, 
particularly if casual, does not meet the Dirks benefit requirement), and SEC v. 
Holley, No. 11-0205, 2015 WL 5554788, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2015) (following the 
Newman court’s interpretation of the Dirks benefit requirement). 
 129. See Heidi Moore, Wall Street and Washington Want You to Believe the Stock Market 
Isn’t Rigged.  Guess What?  It Still Is, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2014, 7:45 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/22/wall-street-washington-
stock-market-rigged-investors (commenting on the erosion of investor confidence in 
the securities markets). 
 130. See infra Part III. 
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A. The Deficiencies of the Classical Theory 
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to use “any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security.131  The Chiarella Court held that when a corporate 
insider trades on material, nonpublic information, the insider has 
breached a duty to the company and its shareholders.132  The insider 
has therefore engaged in a deception in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.133  A breach of fiduciary duty has 
occurred because the insider has, without authorization, effectively 
converted corporate information and used it for his own profit.134  By 
doing so, the corporate insider, similar to the unfaithful trustee, has 
violated the duty of loyalty and fairness to shareholders.135  There is, 
however, a conceptual flaw in linking insider trading liability to a 
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.  It is 
analytically suspect to make the wrong that gives rise to an insider 
trading violation something other than the trade itself.136  In other 
words, the wrong should be the fraud perpetrated on the 
counterparty to the trade rather than an entirely separate wrong 
inflicted on the source of the information. 
SEC v. Zandford,137 however, seems to contradict the premise that 
the deception on the source of the inside information should be 
superfluous to an insider trading violation.  Zandford was a securities 
fraud case rather than an insider trading case.138  It is nevertheless 
relevant because Zandford held that, under appropriate 
circumstances, a broker who stole funds from his clients could be 
liable for securities fraud, though he did not commit a fraud about 
                                                          
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 132. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–27 (1987) (holding that a 
fraud can be perpetrated by depriving a business the exclusive use of its own 
confidential information). 
 135. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense:  An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading 
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 193 (1991) (arguing that, like a trustee, the insider has 
a duty of “utmost fairness” to the corporation and its shareholders (quoting GEORGE 
T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 96, at 348 (6th ed. 1987))). 
 136. See Adam R. Nelson, Note, Extending Outsider Trading Liability to Thieves, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2187 (2012) (observing that “[r]equiring a breach of duty 
between the misappropriator and the source of the information is unrelated to the 
purpose of the prohibition:  to protect investors and the integrity of the market”). 
 137. 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 138. Id. at 815. 
DAVIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  8:12 PM 
2016] INSIDER TRADING FLAW 69 
the securities themselves.139  It might follow by analogy that in an 
insider trading case the fraud need not concern the trade. 
The facts of the case are instructive.  Charles Zandford, a securities 
broker, persuaded William Wood, an elderly man in poor health, to 
open a brokerage account for himself and his mentally infirm 
daughter.140  The Woods entrusted $419,000 to Zandford, conferring 
on Zandford the authority to trade securities without prior 
approval.141  Zandford then sold securities from the Woods’ account 
and transferred all the proceeds to his own account.142  Though 
admitting to the misappropriation of funds, Zandford argued that 
the theft was not “in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security” because he neither misrepresented nor omitted any 
information about a security.143  The securities transactions, he 
argued, were incidental to his scheme, which was to steal the Woods’ 
funds.144  The Supreme Court saw the issue differently, holding that 
Zandford’s scheme was unitary; his plan from the beginning was to 
purchase securities for the Woods’ account, liquidate the securities, 
and misappropriate the proceeds.145  The fraud was therefore in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.146 
At first glance, Zandford might seem to support the current law of 
insider trading.  The deceptive device in Zandford was the theft of the 
proceeds from the sale of securities in the Woods’ account; there was 
no fraud regarding the securities themselves.  By analogy, under the 
current law of insider trading, the fraud is a breach of confidentiality 
on the source of the information; there is no fraud regarding the 
trade.  There is, however, a critical distinction between the Zandford 
case and insider trading cases:  in an insider trading case, the victim 
of the trade is the counterparty, whereas in Zandford the victims of the 
trades were Wood and his daughter.  Thus, in Zandford, unlike 
current insider trading law, the injury was linked to the fraud. 
Another distinction between Zandford and insider trading cases is 
that unlawful insider trading differs significantly from ordinary 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 820. 
 140. Id. at 815. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 815–16. 
 143. Id. at 820. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 820–21. 
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violations of section 10(b).147  An insider trading violation requires 
more than fraud in connection with a purchase or sale of a security.  It 
requires the exploitation of material, nonpublic information in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security.148  Because of this additional 
element, the deceit should connect directly to the insider’s trade. 
By focusing on a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation and its 
shareholders, Chiarella ignores the real victim of the insider trade:  
the counterparty.  Whatever injury the corporation and its 
shareholders suffer from an insider’s breach of fiduciary duty, the 
injury is not the result of the insider’s trade.  The corporation and its 
shareholders would have suffered the same injury regardless of 
whether the insider ever traded on the information.  By way of 
analogy, if a man steals a woman’s purse, whether he sells the purse 
to a third party is irrelevant to her claim for relief. 
1. The harm to the counterparty 
The Supreme Court has unmoored what constitutes an insider 
trading violation from the trade itself and the harm the trade causes.  
The injuries the law should seek to prevent are the deception on the 
counterparty and the inevitable loss in investor confidence.  Whether 
the counterparty actually suffers any injury at all, however, has been a 
controversial question. 
The counterparty has the expectation that the system will not be 
rigged and that insiders will not use informational advantages;149 
however, not all informational advantages are unfair, and those who 
acquire and subsequently trade on inside information are not 
necessarily engaging in deceptive conduct.  Participants in securities 
markets understand that traders operate with asymmetries of 
information.  Parties conduct research and gather information hoping 
to gain an advantage.150  As the Supreme Court has recognized, such 
asymmetries of information are inherent to healthy securities 
                                                          
 147. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider 
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 440 (characterizing insider trading as a sui 
generis form of securities fraud). 
 148. United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 149. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:  A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (noting that ordinary traders feel 
that when their counterparties are armed with inside information, their 
counterparties are unjustly enriched). 
 150. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–58 (1983) (noting that imposing liability 
on all market participants who knowingly receive and trade on inside information 
“could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC 
itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market”). 
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markets.151  A general ban on insider trading would suppress market 
research and punish market participants who have the skill to 
independently discover material, nonpublic information.152 
Exploiting informational advantages arising from positions of power 
and access, however, is unfair.  Insider trading law should punish 
insiders who trade on such information or provide the information to 
tippees who trade on the information.  For example, suppose Trader 
A, owning shares of Mega Corporation, sells his stock to Trader B, who 
has inside information that Mega will soon release a blockbuster 
quarterly earnings report far exceeding Wall Street projections.  When 
the parties make the trade, Mega is fifty dollars per share.  When Mega 
publicly discloses the information one week later, the stock soars to 
sixty dollars per share.  Trader A would have made ten dollars per 
share if he had not sold his Mega stock to Trader B. 
Suppose further that Trader A buys shares of Mega from Trader B, 
who has information that Mega will soon release a dismal quarterly 
earnings report and provide negative forward guidance.  One week 
later, when Mega discloses the negative information, the stock plummets 
from fifty dollars per share to forty dollars per share.  Again, Trader A 
has suffered a loss of ten dollars per share, which he would not have 
sustained had Trader B publicly disclosed the inside information. 
In both cases, the counterparty suffered an injury, and the injury 
would have been averted if the insider had followed the disclose-or-
abstain rule.  In neither case, however, did the trade injure the source 
of the information. 
2. Counterarguments 
Some argue that insider trading does not injure the 
counterparty.153  They point out that the counterparty decides to 
trade or not to trade irrespective of whatever action the insider 
takes.154  Thus, in the first illustration above, Trader A decided to sell 
                                                          
 151. See id. (rejecting the premise that the antifraud provisions of federal 
securities law “require equal information among all traders”). 
 152. See J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading:  United States v. Newman 
and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (2015) (supporting the Supreme 
Court’s inclusion of a duty element in insider trading law because such an element 
frees someone innocently possessing inside information from criminal culpability). 
 153. See, e.g., Leo Katz, The Problem with Consenting to Insider Trading, 69 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 827, 831 (2015) (arguing that when a company endorses insider trading, 
shareholders and non-shareholder traders assume the risk as they would in any 
situation where a party voluntarily accepts a known risk). 
 154. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting:  A Critical Response to the “Chicago 
School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 635 (observing that “the investor is no worse off when the 
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his shares of Mega irrespective of Trader B’s actions.  It may be true 
that if Trader A had the inside information he would not have sold 
his shares, but whether the insider abstained from trading or not, the 
outcome for Trader A would have been the same.  Like reasoning 
applies to the second illustration, where Trader A bought Mega 
shares in advance of a negative disclosure; his decision would have 
been the same whether Trader B traded or did not trade. 
Thus, deciding whether the counterparty sustained a loss depends 
on one’s perspective.  If one focuses on the effect of disclosure versus 
nondisclosure of the inside information, the counterparty suffers a 
loss.  If, on the other hand, one focuses on whether the insider 
traded or did not trade, the counterparty incurs no loss.155 
Advocates of insider trading discount any injury to the 
counterparty because, they argue, the overall benefits of insider 
trading outweigh its overall harm.  They point out that insider 
trading often results in higher share prices over time, which benefits 
most shareholders.156  Similarly, non-insider buyers who purchase 
shares before the dissemination of the inside information benefit 
from insider trading once the information is publicly disclosed.157 
Some justify insider trading by arguing that the profits from such 
trading are a form of executive compensation.  By developing and 
implementing successful business strategies, corporate executives 
generate valuable inside information.  It is fitting, some argue, that they 
benefit from the very information they create.  Allowing executives to 
reap the benefit of their contributions provides them with an incentive 
to continue to develop innovative products and services.158 
                                                          
insider trades than when the insider does not trade [because t]he investor’s decision 
to sell or purchase is unaffected by whether the insider is also secretly buying or 
selling shares in the open market”). 
 155. See William K.S. Wang, The Importance of “The Law of Conservation of Securities”:  
A Reply to John P. Anderson’s “What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?”, 69 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812–14 (2015) (describing how counterparties to insider trading 
are or are not injured). 
 156. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102 (1966) 
(“[T]here is both a plus and a minus for outside sellers from insider trading.  The 
plus is the higher price received by those who would have otherwise sold at the 
stable, lower price, and the minus is the number of sales that now occur but which 
otherwise would not have occurred.”). 
 157. Id. at 103 (“We must add to the plus side of the equation the gain resulting to 
noninside buyers . . . as these individuals are benefited to the same extent as inside 
buyers, if they hold their shares until [the inside information is publicly disclosed].”). 
 158. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition:  A Legal and Economic 
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 46 (1986) (noting that an “entrepreneur’s 
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3. Confidence in the securities markets 
 Despite these back and forth arguments, the sounder conclusion is 
that the counterparty is injured and that such injury requires a robust 
insider trading law.  A primary reason for insider trading law is to foster 
confidence in the securities markets.159  A party trading on material, 
nonpublic information deceives the counterparty who reasonably 
expects securities markets to be fair and not to condone insiders 
exploiting informational advantages.  Investors deserve evenhanded 
markets and laws that provide every investor with an equal chance to 
prosper.  Like civil rights law, securities law should not guarantee 
equality of results, but it should guarantee equality of opportunity.160  
In the domain of securities law, this means equal access to material 
information.  Traders who see their investments dwindle feel cheated 
when beset with an informational disadvantage spawned by unequal 
access.  If the ordinary investor had access to the material information 
that the insider used, then the ordinary investor would have acted 
differently and would have benefitted from the information. 
Ordinary investors feel that the system is rigged.161  They believe 
that corporate insiders have an advantage that renders trading 
securities a game of Russian roulette.  When investor distrust of the 
securities markets swells, their willingness to invest falters, trading 
volume sinks, stock prices fall, and fewer new issues come to 
market.162  This integrity-of-the-markets argument presents a sound 
                                                          
compensation must have a reasonable relation to the value of his contribution to give 
him incentive to produce more information”). 
 159. See generally Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, 
and the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1988) (analyzing the 
different variables that affect consumer confidence in the securities markets, 
including insider trading violations). 
 160. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (stressing that 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 strives to achieve equality of opportunity but 
not equality of result); Kenneth R. Davis, Wheel of Fortune:  A Critique of the “Manifest 
Imbalance” Requirement for Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 43 GA. L. 
REV. 993, 1038 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to 
“reconcile[] equality of opportunity with meritocracy”). 
 161. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 357 (1979) (reporting that inside 
information harms public investors and discourages their entry into the markets, 
which raises the cost of acquiring capital). 
 162. See Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading:  A Legal, 
Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 235 (1992) (noting that 
“[u]nconstrained opportunism based on information asymmetry almost inevitably 
causes market failure,” and that “[e]ven in the absence of a stock market crash, 
information asymmetry is likely to squeeze smaller shareholders from stock market 
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rationale for an approach to insider trading law that is stricter than 
the current regime under section 10(b). 
B. The Deficiencies of the Misappropriation Theory 
The same problems that plague the classical theory apply with equal, 
if not greater, force to the misappropriation theory.  Before discussing 
these deficiencies, however, it is useful to examine the case that 
presaged the misappropriation theory:  Carpenter v. United States.163  In 
Carpenter, R. Foster Winans, a Wall Street Journal reporter partly 
responsible for preparing the touted “Heard on the Street” column, 
provided advance notice of the column to others who traded on the 
information.164  Based on these unauthorized communications, Winans 
was charged with mail fraud and wire fraud.165 
The Supreme Court held that the contents of the column were 
business property and that the use or disclosure of that information, 
without the permission of the Journal, was misappropriation of that 
property.166  Winans, as an employee of the Journal, had a fiduciary 
duty not to misappropriate such information.167  The Court rejected 
Winans’s argument that his conduct caused no harm to the Journal;168 
the harm, the Court believed, was depriving the Journal of the 
exclusive use of the column.169 
It is hard to see, however, how the Journal was harmed.  It maintained 
the power to use the information any way it wished despite the 
misappropriation because, unlike tangible property, both the owner and 
the misappropriator may use the information simultaneously. 
                                                          
participation when they discover that they cannot achieve normal returns in an 
environment of windfall profits realized by unfairly advantaged traders”); see also H.L. 
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV. 
267, 297 (1910) (observing that when a director trades on inside information, he or 
she “offends the moral sense; no shareholder expects to be so treated by the director 
he selects; no director would urge his friends to select him for that reason; that the 
law yet allows him to do this, does more to discourage legitimate investment in 
corporate shares than almost anything else”). 
 163. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 164. Id. at 23. 
 165. Id. at 24. 
 166. Id. at 25, 28; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) 
(holding that “[a] company’s confidential information . . . qualifies as property to 
which the company has a right of exclusive use”). 
 167. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27–28. 
 168. Id. at 26. 
 169. Id. 
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As Chiarella and O’Hagan demonstrate, the Court believes that the 
way the trader acquired the information is critical to determining the 
scope of liability.170  It is understandable why the Court has 
endeavored to limit the scope of insider trading liability to situations 
where the party trading on inside information has wrongfully 
acquired information.  Sometimes researchers acquire information 
legitimately, but the limiting principle that the Supreme Court has 
adopted—deception on the source—is particularly misguided in 
misappropriation cases.171  One problem is that the Court’s limiting 
principle is under-inclusive.172  For example, if the source of 
information encourages the tippee to trade on the information, the 
tippee would not have breached a duty to the source of the 
information by trading; hence, the tippee is not guilty of 
misappropriation.  It makes no sense to determine liability based on 
whether the source permitted or forbade the tippee to trade.  In both 
situations, the harm inflicted on the counterparty and on the public’s 
confidence in the securities markets is the same.173 
                                                          
 170. See supra Sections I.A–B (describing the evolution of the classical and 
misappropriation theories). 
 171. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the 
New Insider Trading Legislation:  From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775, 
830 (1988) (noting that misappropriation seems to have little relevance to securities 
fraud unless the source of the misappropriated information traded with the 
misappropriator); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1496 (1999) (recognizing that “O’Hagan worked a vast, 
unwitting, and wholly unwarranted expansion of Rule 10b-5 to reach deceptions of 
parties wholly outside of and unconnected to the securities markets”). 
 172. The SEC has mitigated this problem to some extent by promulgating Rule 
10b5-2.  This rule establishes for purposes of section 10(b) liability a presumption of 
misappropriation under defined circumstances.  Rule 10b5-2 provides that a duty of 
confidence exists under the following nonexclusive circumstances: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) 
Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information 
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or 
practice of sharing confidences . . . ; or (3) Whenever a person receives or 
obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, 
child, or sibling . . . . 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–(3) (2015).  No duty arises under the third category, 
however, if the recipient, based on the parties’ history or understanding, did not 
reasonably believe the information was conveyed with an expectation of 
confidentiality.  Id. 
 173. See Bryan S. Schultz, Note, Feigning Fidelity to Section 10(b):  Insider Trading 
Liability After United States v. O’Hagan, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411, 1435 (1998) (arguing 
that “[u]nlike the established parameters of the classical theory of insider trading 
liability, the misappropriation theory ignores the plight of the deceived investor”). 
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Another inadequacy of the current approach is that it does not 
clearly forbid trading on stolen information.174  The Second Circuit 
confronted this situation in SEC v. Dorozhko.175  A trader hacked into a 
server and acquired the earnings report of IMS Health before the 
report’s public release.176  Based on this report, the hacker, Oleksandr 
Dorozhko, purchased IMS put options and scored a profit of more 
than $286,000.177  The district court held that because Dorozhko did 
not breach a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidence to either IMS or 
Thomson Financial, the owner of the server, he did not use a 
“deceptive device” within the meaning of section 10(b).178  Taking a 
dubiously expansive view of “deceptive device” in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security, the Second Circuit disagreed, holding 
that misrepresenting one’s identity to gain access to a server is a 
deception under section 10(b).179  Regardless of the Second Circuit’s 
analytical bootstrapping, the court reached the sensible result.  
Dorozhko used the inside information to gain an unfair informational 
advantage, thereby injuring the counterparty and potentially harming 
investor confidence in the securities markets.180 
C. The Deficiencies of the Tipper/Tippee Theory 
Justice Blackmun was correct in arguing that the majority in Dirks 
erred when it rested liability on whether the tipper gained a benefit 
from the trade.181  This Article has argued that an insider’s breach of 
fiduciary duty to the corporation, though wrongful, is wholly 
unconnected to any injury the insider caused by trading on inside 
information.  Even accepting, arguendo, the premise that such a 
                                                          
 174. See Nelson, supra note 136, at 2190–92 (noting that the liability of thieves for 
trading on inside information is unsettled and arguing that holding thieves liable 
under section 10(b) is a “logical extension” of existing doctrine). 
 175. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 176. Id. at 44. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 45. 
 179. Id. at 51. 
 180. See id. at 49 (characterizing the SEC’s argument about Dorozhko’s 
misrepresentation as a “straightforward theory of fraud”); Mark F. DiGiovanni, Note, 
Weeding out a New Theory of Insider Trading Liability and Cultivating an Heirloom Variety:  
A Proposed Response to SEC v. Dorozhko, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 596–97 (2012) 
(arguing that a “constructive breach” theory correctly places Dorozhko within the 
Supreme Court’s analytical framework because the theory creates a fiduciary duty on 
the part of one who wrongfully obtains property from another). 
 181. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 671–73 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The 
fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does not eradicate the 
shareholder’s injury.”). 
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breach of confidentiality should be a pre-requisite to liability, the 
additional requirement that the insider derive a benefit from the 
trade adds yet another level of dysfunction to an already muddled 
framework.  If someone aids and abets a robbery, for example, his 
guilt does not turn on whether he received some of the booty.  In no 
other context does a breach of fiduciary duty hinge on whether the 
fiduciary derived a benefit from his wrongdoing.  Breaches of the 
duty of loyalty, care, and good faith depend on the conduct of the 
fiduciary rather than on whether the breach was profitable.182  For 
example, if the CEO of Corporation A is secretly serving as CEO for 
rival Corporation B, it is not a defense that he was serving as CEO of 
Corporation B free of charge. 
As demonstrated, the law of insider trading condones various cases 
of knowingly trading on inside information.  Current law imposes 
objectionable liability requirements:  there must be a breach of a 
fiduciary duty or confidentiality to the source, and, in tipper/tippee 
cases, the tipper must gain a benefit.  This Article proposes that the 
Cady, Roberts fraud-on-the-market theory could rectify the conceptual 
anomalies that plague the current framework.183 
III. THE CADY, ROBERTS DUTY AND FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY 
The question remains how to redirect the focus of insider trading 
law away from a breach of fiduciary duty to the source and toward a 
breach of duty to the counterparty.  One obstacle to this refocusing is 
the lack of a direct interaction between parties trading in impersonal, 
computerized markets. 
A. The Affiliated Ute Citizens Presumption of Reliance 
The Court’s reasoning in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States 
provides a possible solution to this problem by creating a 
presumption of reliance in omission cases.184  In that case, members 
of the Ute tribe owned shares of Ute Distribution Corp. (“UDC”), a 
                                                          
 182. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921–23, 925–26 (Del. 2000) 
(reinstating shareholders’ claims against directors for breach of fiduciary duties of 
loyalty, care, and good faith for failure to maximize shareholder value in 
recommending sale of chemical corporation); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 351 (Del. 1993) (remanding a case to the trial court where the plaintiff 
argued that the directors breached the duties of loyalty and care by approving a cash-
out merger), modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
 183. See infra Part III. 
 184. 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). 
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company with oil, gas, and mineral rights.185  First Security Bank of 
Utah was the transfer agent of UDC.186  Two assistant managers of the 
bank purchased UDC shares from tribe members at depressed prices, 
failing to disclose the market price.187  The issue was whether the 
plaintiffs failed to meet the reliance element of section 10(b), and 
Rule 10b-5 thereunder, because the fraud was based on omissions, 
not affirmative misrepresentations.188 
The Tenth Circuit held that someone cannot rely on an omission 
because one cannot rely on what a party failed to disclose.189  The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in a material omission case, 
section 10(b) did not require affirmative proof of reliance.190  To 
infer reliance, a court had to find that a reasonable investor might 
have considered the undisclosed information important in making an 
investment decision.191  Because the market price of the stock would 
have been important to someone deciding whether to sell it, the two 
assistant bank managers in Affiliated Ute Citizens had a duty to disclose 
the market price of the stock to the Ute tribe members who sold 
stock to them.192 
There is, however, a potential objection to applying the Affiliated 
Ute Citizens reliance presumption to insider trading cases:  because 
the parties to trades do not deal directly with each other, it would 
seem unreasonable to require the insider to make disclosures to an 
unidentified counterparty.  Failing to make such disclosures would 
therefore not reasonably seem to constitute a breach of duty.  If, on the 
other hand, the presumption of reliance attaches automatically to every 
market participant, one might question whether such a presumption is 
justified where a market is inefficient.  Such a market might not absorb 
and take account of material information.  The disclosure would 
therefore never have reached the counterparty.  To meet this objection, 
one might propose an approach more tenable than the Affiliated Ute 
Citizens presumption of reliance.  This approach, which considers 
                                                          
 185. Id. at 136. 
 186. Id. at 145. 
 187. Id. at 146–47. 
 188. Id. at 152. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 153. 
 191. Id. at 153–54. 
 192. Id. at 153.  Judge Spatt followed this approach in In re Sterling Foster & Co., 
222 F. Supp. 2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), a class action suit alleging unlawful insider 
trading based on material omissions.  Id. at 275 (stating that “[b]ecause the 
complaint is based on the defendants’ failure to disclose material facts, reliance is 
presumed”). 
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market efficiency, is fraud-on-the-market theory based on the Cady, 
Roberts duty to disclose material, nonpublic information.193 
B. The Cady, Roberts Duty to Disclose or Abstain 
In re Cady, Roberts & Co. was an administrative proceeding in which 
the SEC charged Robert Gintel, a partner of a broker-dealer firm, with 
unlawful insider trading.194  Gintel had learned of a cut in the 
dividends of Curtis-Wright, a company traded on the NYSE.195  Based 
on this nonpublic information, Gintel exercised his discretionary 
authority to sell his clients’ Curtis-Wright stock.196  The SEC found that 
Gintel had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.197  In so holding, the 
SEC issued a pronouncement that has shaped securities law: 
We[] and the courts have consistently held that insiders must 
disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their 
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal 
and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.  
Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a 
violation of the anti-fraud provisions.  If, on the other hand, 
disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper 
or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is 
to forego the transaction.198 
This requirement—either to publicly disclose material information 
or abstain from trading—is the duty on which to base insider trading 
law.  When people trade a security based on inside information, they 
breach the Cady, Roberts duty of disclosure.  Such a material omission 
is a deception that violates section 10(b).199 
                                                          
 193. See infra Section III.B–C; see also supra text accompanying note 21 (suggesting 
that fraud-on-the-market theory might be applied to insider trading cases). 
 194. 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961). 
 195. Id. at 909. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 911, 917–18.  The SEC found that Gintel’s wrongful conduct was willful.  
Id. at 917.  As a mitigating factor, the SEC also found that the leak of the information 
to Gintel was not planned.  Therefore, in addition to the $3,000 fine imposed by the 
NYSE, the SEC suspended Gintel from the NYSE for only twenty days.  Id.  
Commissioner Frear found the suspension insufficient.  Id. at 918. 
 198. Id. at 911 (footnote omitted). 
 199. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972) 
(holding that Rule 10(b) may be violated absent a material misrepresentation of fact). 
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C. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 
The Supreme Court established fraud-on-the-market theory in 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson.200  Beginning in 1976, Basic engaged in merger 
talks with Combustion Engineering, but Basic issued three public 
statements denying these merger negotiations.201  When Basic 
announced a tender offer from Combustion Engineering in 
December of 1978, Basic’s stock rose.202  Former Basic shareholders 
who had sold their shares before Basic announced the tender offer 
sued under section 10(b), alleging that they sold at depressed 
prices.203  The issue was whether, in this class action, the law could 
presume that the plaintiffs relied on the three public statements 
denying merger negotiations.204  Adopting fraud-on-the-market-
theory, the Court established a rebuttable presumption of reliance.205  
To explain the presumption, the Court quoted Peil v. Speiser206: 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in 
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s 
stock is determined by the available material information regarding 
the company and its business. . . .  Misleading statements will 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements. . . .  The causal connection 
between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock 
in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance 
on misrepresentations.207 
                                                          
 200. 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).  For a further discussion of fraud-on-the-market 
case law, see infra notes 217–28 and accompanying text (discussing Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416–17 (2014)). 
 201. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227; see also id. at 241–42 (discussing factors to help 
delineate when a market is efficient or, in the words of Basic, “open and developed,” 
and explaining that such markets are entitled to the presumption raised by fraud-on-
the-market theory); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989) 
(articulating five factors to help determine the applicability of fraud-on-the-market 
theory:  (1) high average trading volume of the security in question (a volume of two 
percent of the public float would justify a strong presumption of market efficiency); 
(2) the number of securities analysts following the security in question; (3) the 
number of markets on which the security in question trades; (4) the entitlement of 
the company in question to file an S-3 Registration Statement with the SEC; and (5) 
the immediacy of a reaction in the price of the security in question to unexpected 
corporate events or informational releases). 
 202. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 242. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 207. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). 
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The presumption is not absolute.  It applies only when a market is 
well-developed and therefore efficient in disseminating 
information.208  Such efficiency assures that the information will 
affect the price of the security in question.209  As the Court observed, 
“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’s premise 
that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets 
reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material 
misrepresentations.”210  The Court pointed out that the defendants 
might have rebutted this presumption in several ways.211  For 
example, if the defendants could have proven that the market makers 
knew about the merger talks, their knowledge would have corrected 
any distortion of the stock price in the marketplace.212  Similarly, a 
below-fair-value market price would have been eliminated if news of 
the merger negotiations had filtered into the marketplace.213  A third 
example would be if the plaintiffs should have known of the merger 
negotiations but sold anyway for other reasons such as potential 
antitrust concerns or political pressure.214 
Although Basic was a material misrepresentation case, the 
rebuttable presumption of fraud-on-the-market theory also applies to 
material omission cases.215  Insider trading cases involve material 
omissions; thus, the party trading on inside information has a Cady, 
Roberts duty to publicly disclose the inside information.216  A failure to 
meet this duty in an efficient market affects every party who owns or 
trades the relevant security. 
                                                          
 208. Id. at 247. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 246. 
 211. Id. at 248. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 249. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
“the presumption of reliance is available only when a plaintiff alleges that a 
defendant made material representations or omissions concerning a security that is 
actively traded in an ‘efficient market,’ thereby establishing a ‘fraud on the 
market’”); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that “[o]ne of the circumstances justifying a presumption of reliance arises 
when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant made material representations or omissions 
concerning a security that is actively traded on an efficient market, thereby 
establishing a fraud on the market”); In re Sterling Foster & Co., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216, 
274–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing the applicability of fraud-on-the-market theory 
to a case involving both material misrepresentations and omissions). 
 216. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). 
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The Supreme Court in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.217 
reaffirmed and elaborated fraud-on-the-market theory.218  The 
Halliburton Court addressed two principal arguments.  First, 
Halliburton questioned the Basic Court’s premise of the efficient 
dissemination of information in securities markets.219  Halliburton 
argued that recent empirical evidence showed that some publicly 
disclosed information is not absorbed immediately into the 
markets.220  The Court dispensed with this argument, noting that 
under fraud-on-the-market theory, the presumption of reliance is 
rebuttable.221  If a defendant proves that publicly disclosed 
information did not reach or affect investors, the party would rebut 
the presumption of reliance.222  The second argument questioned 
whether most investors rely on the integrity of the market.223  
Halliburton cited so-called value investors, day traders, and volatility 
arbitragers as examples of investors who are largely indifferent to 
market information.224  For example, day traders, who seek out and 
buy undervalued stocks, concentrate on long-term upward trends 
they perceive in the prices of securities rather than on passing 
                                                          
 217. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 218. Id. at 2417. 
 219. Id. at 2409.  The Supreme Court pointed out that Basic never characterized 
market efficiency as binary.  Id.  Because the Court recognized that market efficiency 
is imperfect, it made the presumption of reliance rebuttable and subject to the 
evidence bearing on the circumstances raised in any particular litigation.  Id. at 2410.  
See Baruch Lev and Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages:  A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994) (arguing that capital 
markets are not fundamentally efficient and, though noting significant exceptions, 
stating that fundamental market information is not the primary influence on the 
price of an individual stock or the market in general); see also Roberta S. Karmel, 
When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 BUS. LAW. 25, 54 
(2007) (arguing that a wholesale repudiation of fraud-on-the-market theory would 
weaken the effectiveness of the SEC’s integrated disclosure system and impair the 
viability of worthy class actions).  But see Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:  
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 167–68 (characterizing the 
application of fraud-on-the-market theory as a “judicial muddle” and arguing that 
because market efficiency is not a binary, yes-or-no question, one cannot sensibly 
argue in every case that material information affects market prices). 
 220. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 221. Id. at 2410. 
 222. Id. at 2410–11. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
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information.225  The Court answered this argument by noting again 
that the Basic presumption is rebuttable, stressing that Basic merely 
presumed the reliance of most, but not all, investors.226  The Court 
also questioned whether any investors, including value investors, are 
indifferent to the integrity of market prices.227  Such investors 
ultimately rely on all available material information.228 
Applying fraud-on-the-market theory to the Cady, Roberts duty to 
disclose would resolve the conceptual deficiencies of current insider 
trading law.  This new theory of unlawful insider trading would 
eliminate the requirement of establishing a breach of fiduciary duty 
or confidentiality on the source of the information.  A fraud-on-the-
market theory of insider trading would also do away with the Dirks 
requirement that the tipper receive a benefit from the trade.229  The 
efficacy of fraud-on-the-market theory, however, is limited to 
instances where the security in question trades on an efficient 
market.  Although most cases involve securities traded on efficient 
markets, such as the NYSE or the NASDAQ, congressional enactment 
of a law dedicated to insider trading would present an even more 
comprehensive means for revamping insider trading law. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO IMPROVE INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Congress should enact a new provision that, unlike section 10(b), is 
dedicated specifically to insider trading.  Three legislative proposals 
are pending before Congress. 
A. Pending Legislation 
Congressman Stephen Lynch,230 Congressman James Himes,231 and 
Senators Jack Reed and Robert Menendez232 have each proposed 
legislation.  All three will be discussed below. 
                                                          
 225. See id. at 2410 (explaining that while false, passing statements affect the price 
of a stock, market professionals focus on the “material statements about companies,” 
which affect the whole market). 
 226. Id. at 2411. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See id. (explaining that a stock’s market price eventually reflects material 
information). 
 229. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 (1983) (finding no violation of the Cady, 
Roberts duty where employees did not obtain monetary or personal benefit for 
revealing secrets). 
 230. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 231. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 232. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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1. The Lynch bill 
This bill would make it unlawful “[t]o purchase or sell any 
security, . . . based on information that the person knows or . . . 
should know is material information and inside information.”233  An 
improvement on current insider trading law, this bill would eliminate 
the requirement that the tipper receive a benefit from the tippee.234  
This proposal, however, is problematic because it retains the 
conceptual flaw of classical theory and misappropriation theory by 
defining inside information as information that is obtained “directly 
or indirectly from an issuer with an expectation of confidentiality or 
that such information will only be used for a legitimate business 
purposes [sic]; or in violation of a fiduciary duty.”235 
2. The Himes bill 
Broader in the scope of its prohibitions than the Lynch bill, the 
Himes bill would make it unlawful to purchase or sell a security while 
in possession of material, nonpublic information if the person knows 
or recklessly disregards that such information was obtained by theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage, deception, or a breach of 
fiduciary duty or confidence.236  This proposal would thus retain the 
classical and misappropriation theories while expanding the list of 
prohibited means for acquiring the inside information.237  This law 
would make it unlawful to communicate material, nonpublic 
information to another person if it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the other person would purchase or sell the security using the 
information or provide the information to a third party who might 
foreseeably purchase or sell the security.238  A person who knew or 
recklessly disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained 
or communicated has committed a violation even if the person did 
not know the means through which the information was obtained or 
whether the tipper received a personal benefit.239 
                                                          
 233. H.R. 1173 § 2. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. H.R. 1625 § 2. 
 237. See id. (broadening the list of prohibited means to include “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, or espionage”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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3. The Reed-Menendez bill 
The best of the three proposals, a bill sponsored by Senators Jack 
Reed and Robert Menendez, would impose an even broader insider 
trading ban than the Lynch and Himes bills.  This bill would make it 
unlawful “[t]o purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any 
security on the basis of material information that that the person 
knows or has reason to know is not publicly available.”240  Because the 
Reed-Menendez bill does not catalogue unlawful means of acquiring 
inside information, it is preferable to the Himes bill.  All that the 
Reed-Menendez bill requires is that the information be material and 
nonpublic.241  Like the Lynch and Himes bills, the Reed-Menendez 
bill would impose a broad scope of tipper/tippee liability by making 
it unlawful “[t]o knowingly or recklessly communicate material 
information that the person knows or has reason to know is not 
publicly available to any other person under circumstances in which 
it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result 
in [liability for insider trading].”242  The Dirks benefit requirements 
would thus be discarded.  This bill protects trading based on bona 
fide research by exempting from liability a person who trades on 
“information that the person has independently developed from 
publicly available sources.”243 
B. A Proposed Revision of the Reed-Menendez Bill 
The Reed-Menendez bill, though vastly superior to the present law 
of insider trading, might be improved.  As noted, the bill makes it 
unlawful to knowingly or recklessly communicate material 
information when it is reasonably foreseeable that the recipient will 
trade on the information.244  This prohibition of insider trading 
unnecessarily limits potential liability in two ways.  First, the 
requirement that the source of the information “knowingly or 
recklessly” communicates the information should be deleted because 
recklessness is an unnecessarily ambiguous standard.  SEC v. Switzer245 
illustrates the problematic nature of this standard. 
In Switzer, Barry Switzer, the well-known head coach of the 
University of Oklahoma football team, attended a track meet 
                                                          
 240. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
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conducted at the university’s field.246  George Platt, who also attended 
the meet, was a director of Phoenix Resources and the CEO of Texas 
International, which had acquired Phoenix Resources.247  Though 
Switzer and Platt knew each other and greeted each other at the 
event, neither knew that the other planned to attend, and they did 
not sit together.248  While in the stands, Switzer overheard Platt tell 
his wife that Phoenix might be liquidated.249  Switzer passed this 
information to several of his friends, and he and his friends traded 
Phoenix shares and profited from the transactions.250 
The district court found that Platt had unintentionally passed this 
inside information to Switzer, and therefore neither he nor Switzer 
violated section 10(b).251  It would seem reasonable, however, to find 
that Platt violated the section by acting recklessly.  One might 
question why this nebulous standard should be incorporated into a 
new insider trading law.252 
One might go a step further:  In civil cases, the mental state of the 
person communicating the information to another person should 
not matter in determining whether a violation has occurred.253  The 
mere communication of the insider information, regardless of the 
circumstances, should be enough to impose liability on the insider.  
The law should impose on insiders a duty to protect the 
confidentiality of material, nonpublic information.  Whether acting 
                                                          
 246. Id. at 761. 
 247. Id. at 758–60. 
 248. Id. at 761. 
 249. Id. at 762. 
 250. Id. at 762–63. 
 251. Id. at 762, 766. 
 252. The federal circuit courts have uniformly accepted a showing of recklessness 
to meet the scienter requirement of a section 10(b) violation.  See e.g., In re Ikon 
Office Sols., Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that to meet the scienter 
element of section 10(b), a plaintiff must show highly unreasonable conduct 
exceeding mere negligence); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569–
70 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 
1044–45 (7th Cir. 1977)) (holding that an extreme departure from ordinary care 
constitutes recklessness).  There would be, however, no inconsistency in rejecting 
recklessness as the standard of liability for communicating inside information to a 
third party.  In an ordinary securities fraud case, the recklessness standard applies to 
the deceptive conduct, whereas—in an insider trading case—communicating insider 
information is not the deceptive conduct.  See Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer’s Duty 
Under Rule 10b-5 to Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 289, 293, 300 (1991) (explaining that failure to disclose the inside information 
to the counterparty constitutes the fraudulent omission). 
 253. In criminal cases, a higher standard of mens rea would be necessary to 
support a conviction. 
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with intent, recklessness, negligence, or even without fault, the 
person communicating the information has failed to meet that duty 
and has tacitly, if not actively, encouraged the recipient of the 
information to use it for profit.  Such a use undermines investor trust 
in the integrity of the securities markets.254  A decline in investor trust 
could result in the curtailment of trading activity and initial and 
secondary public offerings.255  The current regime established in 
Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks has already threatened investor 
confidence.  A new law should, in civil cases, impose strict liability on 
those who provide material, nonpublic information and those who 
trade on that information.  The one exception should cover instances 
where the information was acquired though legitimate research. 
The Reed-Menendez bill makes the communication of inside 
information unlawful only “under circumstances in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in 
a” prohibited insider trade.256  This qualification on liability should 
also be deleted.  Any time that a tipper communicates material, 
nonpublic information to a third party, it follows that the third party 
is reasonably likely to trade on that information.  Yet, the bill implies 
that the DOJ, SEC, or individual plaintiff must prove something more 
than this apparent inference.  Such proof might, for example, be the 
recipient’s statement indicating an intention to trade.  Requiring 
such a statement, however, would put a nonsensical pre-condition on 
liability.  Tippers and tippees are sophisticated, and they quickly 
catch on to the rules of the game.  The law should not coach the 
tippee to solemnly disavow to the tipper the intent to trade, thereby 
exonerating the tipper. 
If both of the changes suggested in this Article were adopted, the 
relevant subsection would provide as follows:  It is unlawful to 
communicate nonpublic material information to any person who 
trades on the basis of the communicated information, if the person 
communicating the information knows or has reason to know that 
the communicated information is not publicly available.257 
                                                          
 254. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
 257. This provision would impose a general restriction on insider trading similar 
in scope to the ban prescribed in Rule 14e-3 for trading on inside information 
relating to tender offers.  Rule 14e-3(a) provides that 
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has 
commenced, a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute a 
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of 
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CONCLUSION 
It is astonishing that federal law lacks a specific insider trading 
prohibition.  Congress has ceded its responsibility to the Supreme 
Court, which has strained the language of section 10(b) to fashion a 
federal common law of insider trading.258  Unfortunately, it is not 
sound law.  The Supreme Court has revealed its bias disfavoring a 
broad prohibition of insider trading.  It has touted the benefits of a 
framework that gives wide latitude to “market research,” even when 
certain “research” methods seem suspect, if not blatantly wrongful.  
The current regime must be overhauled, if not abandoned.  Under 
present law, if someone in a restaurant overhears Tim Cook tell a 
colleague that Apple will soon announce blowout earnings, the 
eavesdropper may trade on the information with impunity.  It is 
unclear under current law whether someone has violated section 
10(b) by breaking into the offices of a corporation, discovering 
evidence of flagging sales, and selling the company’s stock short.  If 
an ex-director of a company tips off an acquaintance that the 
Department of Justice is investigating the company for falsifying its 
balance sheet in a 10K filing, the tippee may trade the stock even if 
the investigation is undisclosed to the public.  One must wonder how 
this can be so. 
Many people feel that the “system” is rigged.  This sense of futility 
rages in the public mind over income inequality, Washington politics, 
and Wall Street financial shenanigans.  Unprecedented dissatisfaction 
with the 2016 presidential candidates, underlines the public’s 
frustration, malaise, and anger.259  This Article does not presume to 
                                                          
section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material 
information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has 
reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has 
been acquired directly or indirectly [from the offering person, the issuer, or 
anyone acting on their behalf]. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2015); see also Council Directive 2003/6, arts. 1–4, 2003 O.J. 
(L 96) 20–21 (EC) (broadly banning trading on inside information in the European 
Union without limiting liability to breaches of confidentiality or the tipper’s 
acquisition of benefits). 
 258. See Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 
935 (2014) (referring to the development of insider trading law as a “common-law-
like elaboration”). 
 259. See Brian Naylor, This Election, Anger and Frustration Aren’t Just on the Right, 
NPR (Jan. 22, 2016, 4:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/22/464013725/this-
election-anger-and-frustration-isnt-just-on-the-right (discussing the widespread 
dissatisfaction among the electorate); Clinton Holds Lead amid Record High Dislike of 
Both Nominees, MONMOUTH U. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-
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suggest how to quell public discontent.  But the Article does offer a 
replacement for tortuous insider trading law.  We need a law that will 
restore public confidence in at least one facet of the largely 
discredited financial markets.  Let’s give the public something to 
celebrate. 
                                                          
institute/reports/MonmouthPoll_US_082916/ (reporting a poll showing that thirty-
five percent of respondents did not have a favorable view of either major presidential 
candidate). 
